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J. INTELL PROP. L
"I HOPE THE IRONY IS NOT LOST ON ANYONE THAT
THE DRUG COMPANIES AND THEIR LAWYERS ARE
ALLEGING THAT I HAVE A PROFIT MOTIVE."'
-Kyle Bass
Hedge Fund Manager
Hayman Capital
I. INTRODUCTION
An ironic state of affairs exists indeed when allegations and cries of "profit
motive!" come from private, for-profit pharmaceutical manufacturers. But
hedge fund manager Kyle Bass finds himself in such a state after his Coalition
for Affordable Drugs (Coalition) began filing inter partes review (TPR) petitions,
asking the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to invalidate drug patents
held by several pharmaceutical companies. 2 An invalidation would seriously
hurt a company whose profits depend on the patent-conferred ability to exclude
competitors from manufacturing the same drugs. As such, the news of Bass's
filings have spooked some investors, causing share prices to fall in some of the
companies whose patents were challenged-3 Therein lies Bass's profit motive:
his hedge fund, Hayman Capital, is also selling short the stocks of the
companies whose drug patents it has challenged. 4 By doing so, the fund stands
to profit when the companies' share prices decline (unlike traditional, "long"
investors, who stand to profit when a company's shares appreciate in value).5
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), a
trade association, has decried the practice and sought legislative reforms aimed
at curtailing "hedge funds and other speculators from abusing IPRs in the
1 CNBC Exclusive: CNBC Transcript: Hayman Capital Management Founder Kyle Bass Speaks with
CNBC's David Faber on "Squawk on the Street" Today (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://www.cnbc.
com/2015/09/15/cnbc-exclusive-cnbc-transcript-hayman-capital-management- founder-kyle-bas
s-speaks-with-cnbcs-david-faber-on-squawk-on-the-street-today.html.
2 Brian Nolan & Michael Martinez, New Enemy Challenging Biopbarma Patents: Investment Firms, 22
WESTLAWJ. INTELL. PROP., no. 8, 2015, at 1, 2.
3 See id at 2 (noting that some, but not all, of the companies experienced a post-filing decline
in share price).
4 Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short the Stock,
WAL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-
bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent- 1428417408.
5 Joanna Lee, Activist Short Sellers: Market Manoulators or Market Protectors?, 32 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 274, 274 (2013).
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context of such biopharmaceutical patents."' 6 Bass, in return, argues that his
activities represent a proper challenge to pharmaceutical companies unjustly
reaping the benefits of patents that should not have been granted in the first
place.7 Regardless of whether his specific challenges succeed, he has identified
a potential solution to free-rider problems in the quest for ridding the system of
patents that never should have been granted. If a pharmaceutical patent is
invalidated, competitors are free to enter the market and begin manufacturing
generics. Everyone but the holder of the invalid patent benefits: Competitors
from the opening of new markets, and the general public from the lower drug
prices associated with competition. Where, then, is the incentive to challenge a
patent if all competitors will benefit from one competitor's successful
challenge? Bass's strategy of simultaneously short selling the stock and
challenging the patents creates a financial incentive to invest time and resources
in discovering the information that certain patents may be invalid.
In order to lay the groundwork for the argument that Bass's strategy creates
an appropriate mechanism for overcoming free-rider problems in patent validity
challenges, Part II of this Note will first explore the relevant patent law. This
includes the economic justification for patent protection, problems with patent
validity and the free-rider problem inherent therein, as well as the new
procedures for challenging patent validity created by the America Invents Act
(AlA), which Bass employed. Part II then takes a detour through relevant areas
of securities law to identify the boundaries of acceptable short-selling practices
that patent challengers such as Bass must observe. Finally, Part II provides a
brief overview of Bass's specific activities as of the writing of this Note, its
reception with the PTAB thus far, and the pharmaceutical industry's response
and calls for legislative change.
Part III of this Note argues that despite criticism from the pharmaceutical
industry, the strategy employed by Bass and his fund represents a new
mechanism for creating an acceptable financial incentive for the discovery of
and challenge to potentially invalid patents. If one believes that a company is
unfairly profiting from patents that are potentially invalid, that person should be
able to simultaneously sell short that company's stock and file a petition to
institute an inter partes review. If that challenger is right and the patent is
invalidated, he is sure to profit on his short sale, thus allowing him to
potentially recoup some of the resources he invested in seeking out the
6 PhRMA Statement On Markup Of H.R. 9, The Innovation Act (June 11, 2015), http://www.
phrmao rg/media-releases/phrma-statement-on-markup-of-hr-9-the-innovation-act#sthash.uK6
xQOdd.dpuf.
7 Julia La Roche, Kyk Bass eviscerates a drug company's critiism of him short seling their stock, Bus.
INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/kylc bass-response-to-celgene-mot
ion-2015-8.
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potentially invalid patent. Creating financial incentives for the discovery of
information that would otherwise be undersupplied is, after all, the very
purpose of intellectual property protection. 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. PATENT LAW
1. Economic Theory of Patent Law. Patent law in the United States has its roots
in the Constitution itself. Article I explicitly grants Congress the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 9 The purpose of enumerating such a power to Congress is
the economic notion that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "10 The federal government
accomplishes this goal by granting to a patentee "the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States."'" If Congress
could not confer the monopoly rights inherent in a patent on the inventor,
"even successfully made inventions would languish, since it would be
unprofitable to spend the resources necessary to transform the invention into a
saleable product."'12 This is because an invention, as a form of information, is a
public good-13  Thus, such information, including inventions, is both
nonrivarous, meaning "one person's use of it does not leave any less for
another to use," and nonexcludable, meaning "it is difficult to restrict its use to
those who have paid for access."'1 4 A free market tends to underproduce public
goods, as the aforementioned characteristics impede the inventor's efforts to
recoup the high fixed costs associated with research and development of the
good.1 5 The patent-conferred right on inventors to temporarily control the use
8 See R. CARL Moy, 1 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:39 (4th ed. 2016) (noting that "the
favored explanation for the patent system in the United States... is that it creates an incentive
for persons to engage in inventive activity").
' U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, ci. 8.
10 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
11 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015).
12 MOY, sura note 8,§ 1:41.
13 Joseph Scott Miller, Builing a Better Bouny: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19
BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 667, 681-82 (2004).
14 Id at 682.
15 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Propertj Law, 75 TFx. L. REV. 989,
994-96 (1997).
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and distribution of their information creates an incentive to "invest efficiently in
the production of new ideas."' 6 Accordingly, patent law represents an attempt
to overcome a free-rider problem that would otherwise inhibit the market from
producing the socially optimal amount of useful inventions.
Despite their obvious benefits, patent-conferred temporary monopoly rights
do not come without costs in a free-market economy like America. The societal
costs imposed by America's patent regime result primarily from "the distorting
effect that patent rights have on competition and the optimal allocation of
resources that such competition supposedly creates."'1 7 In recognition of such
costs, Congress refuses to grant indefinite exclusionary rights to inventors, but
instead limits the grant of patent rights to a fixed term of twenty years. 18
2. Patent Validigy Pmblems. The delicate balance between the potential
benefits (spurring innovation) and potential costs (distorting free markets)
inherent in granting patent rights demonstrates the need for a finely tuned
system that freely grants patent protection for deserving inventions, but avoids
granting patent protection where none is appropriate. 19  Such a system,
unfortunately, does not reflect our own. For example, an empirical study
conducted by Professors John Allison and Mark Lemley on the validity of
litigated patents conducted in 1998 found that federal courts held a mere 54%
of challenged patents valid, which is "little better than a coin toss. '20 That
study evaluated all written, final validity decisions by either district courts or the
Federal Circuit during a seven-year period from 1989 to 1996.21 In 2014, the
same authors updated and expanded the 1998 study with a new data set.2 The
updated study included eleven "substantive decisions rendered by any court in
every patent case filed in 2008 and 2009 - decisions made between 2009 and
2013. ' '23 The updated study found that while the nature of validity challenges
has evolved (including, among other aspects, a heavier reliance on the doctrines
of patentable subject matter and indefiniteness as opposed to obviousness and
prior art), patent holders still struggle in validity litigation.24 The updated study
found that patentees won only 26% of definitive merits rulings on validity
16 Id. at 996.
17 MoY, supra note 8, § 1:31.
18 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015).
19 Inventions that are neither novel nor useful cannot receive patent protection. 35 U.S.C.
101 (2015).
20 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lernley, Empirical Etidence on the Vaidioy of Liigated Patents, 26
AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998).
21 Id. at 194.
22 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understaning the Reaflies of Modern
Patent Litigation, 92 TEx. L. REv. 1769, 1769 (2014).
23 Id. at 1770.
24 Id at 1782.
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during the test period.25 The two Allison and Lemley empirical studies, viewed
together, suggest that problems with patent validity have only increased over
time.
While relatively few patents are actually challenged through litigation, these
statistics are still striking in their suggestion that the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office may be "failing to do a serious job of examining patents, thus allowing
bad patents to slip through the system." 26 The existence of these "bad patents"
in turn imposes several costs on society. One such cost, among several others,
is "supra-competitive pricing, in the absence of non-infringing product
substitutes." 27 In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, this means that
manufacturers holding bad patents can keep prices unnecessarily high by
excluding competitors who would otherwise be free to produce generic drugs
and create downward pressure on prices in that market.
Given these costs, the invalidation of a patent that never should have been
granted is objectively good for the market. It follows, then, that the
identification of a potentially invalid patent is a valuable piece of information.
But information, remember, is a public good. Just like information about useful
inventions will be undersupplied in a free market absent the incentives provided
by patent law, so too will information about the identification and discovery of
potentially invalid patents be undersupplied absent any form of incentive. In
1971, the Supreme Court inadvertently amplified this problem when it
recognized the doctrine of nonmutual defensive issue preclusion. 28 In the
context of patent litigation, this doctrine implies that an alleged infringer may
raise a plea of estoppel when the patent in question has already been declared
invalid 29 The Court reasoned that a patentee "who has had one fair and full
opportunity to prove a claim and has failed in that effort, should not be
permitted to go to trial on the merits of that claim a second time."' 3 While this
rule certainly helps to further policy aims such as consistency and judicial
efficiency, it eliminates the incentive to invest time and resources in the
discovery and weeding out of dubious patents. This is because a party who
successfully obtains a judgment invalidating a patent "earns a benefit not only
for itself but for everyone, including those of this winner's competitors who
25 Id at 1787 (finding that patentees won only 164 of 636 definitive merits rulings during the
test period).
26 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1495 n.1 (2001)
(compiling instances of such complaints being levied against the Patent and Trademark Office in
both academic sources and popular media).
27 Jay P. Kesan, Carmts and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763,
767-68 (2002).
28 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
29 Id. at 350.
30 Id at 324.
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were either practicing the patented technology already or might wish to adopt it
in the future. '31 Scholars have since proposed solutions designed to address
this free-rider problem now inherent in patent validity litigation, primarily by
designing various mechanisms for compensating people for investing in keeping
bad patents out of the system.32
3. The America Invents Act. A patent regime that seeks to mitigate the societal
costs imposed by granting "bad patents" must provide mechanisms for
challenging questionable patents. Litigation is an obvious choice, but patent
litigation is very costly.33 Accordingly, Congress has created a number of
extrajudicial proceedings for challenging patent validity. The most recent
legislation creating administrative, post-grant patent challenge proceedings is
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 34 Through the ALA, Congress sought
"to establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve
patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs. '35
To accomplish this goal, the AILA created two new administrative challenge
proceedings: the post-grant review36 and the inter partes review.37 The AlA
also created a special body within the Patent and Trademark Office, the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to hear post-grant review and inter partes
review proceedings. 38
A post-grant review allows a third party to file a petition to the PTAB
seeking to cancel one or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be
raised under 35 U.S.C. §§ 282(b)(2) or (3), relating to the invalidity of the patent
as a whole or any individual claim.39 Any third party may file a post-grant
review petition any time after nine months has passed since the granting of the
31 Miller, supra note 13, at 673.
32 See Kesan, supra note 27, at 787 (proposing a fee-shifting program whereby the patentee
would be forced to pay all or a part of a successful challenger's fees when the patent is invalidated
based on prior art that should have been reasonably discoverable to a diligent patentee); Miller,
supra note 13, at 677, 704 (proposing a litigation-stage cash bounty paid directly to a successful
patent challenger that need not be shared with others); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective
Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 342 (proposing an
examination-stage cash bounty paid to third parties who provide the Patent and Trademark
Office with information that contributes to the rejection of a patent application).
33 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Assoc., REPORT O rH.E ECONOMIC SuRvEY 2015, at 37
(2015) (calculating that median all-inclusive litigation costs for all varieties of patent litigation suits
range from $600,000 to $5 million, depending on the amount of money at risk in the suit).
34 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
35 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98(), at 69 (2011).
36 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-329.
37 Id % 311-319.
38 Id 6(b)(4).39 Id. 321 (b).
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patent.4° The Director will grant the review if the information in the petition
suggests that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims
is in fact unpatentable. 41 The PTAB will then issue a final decision within one
year after the review is granted.42 A party dissatisfied with the PTAB's final
decision on a post-grant review may appeal the decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.43
An inter partes review allows a third party to file a petition to the PTAB
seeking to cancel one or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be
raised under 35 U.S.C. 5 102 or 103, relating to the novelty or non-
obviousness requirements, and only on the basis of prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications."4 Any third party can file such a petition after
the latter of either nine months after the granting of the patent or the
termination of a post-grant review. The statute defines a third party as any
person who is not the owner of the patent, regardless of whether or not that
person would have had standing to file suit in the federal courts.45 The
Director will grant the inter partes review if he determines that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would succeed with regard to at least
one challenged claim.46 The PTAB will then issue a final decision on the
petition within one year from the institution of the review.47 Any party
dissatisfied with the PTAB's final decision may likewise appeal to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.48 Finally, the Director
has discretion to prescribe sanctions for the abuse of process. 49
Bass has employed this inter partes review procedure to challenge patents
held by pharmaceutical companies whose stock he has also sold short.
Specifically, the lack of any standing requirement for filing an inter partes
review is what allows Bass, as neither a patent holder nor an alleged infringer, to
avail himself of this new proceeding.
40 Id § 321(a), 321(c).
41 Id. § 324(a).
42 Id § 326(a)(11).
43 Id 329.
- Id 311 (b).
45 Id. % 311(a), 311(c).
- Id. 314(a).
47 Id. 316(a) (11).
48 Id. 319(a).
49 Id. 316(a)(6).
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B. SECURITIES LAW
A brief review of some applicable securities law is necessary to an analysis of
Bass's activity, to ensure that his tactics fall squarely within the boundaries
prescribed by any relevant regulations.
1. Short Selling. Short selling is a type of securities trading which allows a
trader to profit if the price of a security falls.5s The trader does this by first
borrowing the security from someone else, usually a broker, and selling the
borrowed security in a market transaction.5' The trader completes the
transaction by later purchasing an equivalent security on the market, and
returning it to the lender.5 2 Put differently, if Bass believes a company's stock
price is likely to fall (because, say, he believes that their business model relies on
patents that will eventually be declared invalid), he can borrow some shares of
that company's stock from a broker. He will then sell that stock (which he has
borrowed, but not bought) in the open stock market. Later, once the price has
in fact fallen, Bass will return to the stock market to buy shares of that
company, which he will then return to the broker from whom he borrowed the
initial stock.
If the price of the security did, as a trader predicted, fall in between the time
he initially sold the borrowed security and the time he subsequently bought an
equivalent security, he has effectively sold high and bought low, and managed
to turn a profit trading in a security whose price has fallen.5 3 However, if the
price of the security rises, contrary to the trader's prediction, he will lose money
on the short sale.54
The majority of straightforward short sales are legal.5 5 The practice can
serve many productive functions in the market. A trader may short sell a stock
because he believes it to be overvalued, and anticipates a decline in its price.56
Other investors use short sales as a means of hedging the risk created by long
positions in their portfolio.57 Finally, short sellers in the market for a given
security can provide liquidity in response to unanticipated demand. Despite
these benefits provided by short selling, the practice begins to draw scrutiny and
cross the boundary of legality when traders engage in abusive short sale
50 Abel Ramirez Jr., Are Short Sellers Real# the Enemy of Efficient Securities Markets? A Discussion of
Misconceptions After the Financial Crisis, 42 SEc. RFG. L.J. 31 (2014).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 700 (2d Cir. 1998); Ramirez, supra note 50.
54 Levitin, 159 F.3d at 700.
55 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCiIANGE COMISSION, KinY POINTS ABOUT REGULATION SHO
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/regsho.htm.
56 Ramirez, supra note 50.
57 Id
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practices. 58 Short selling can be abusive, and thus illegal, when it amounts to
"market manipulation," or when it is employed in conjunction with insider
trading. 59
2. Market Manpulation. In response to the manipulative and abusive
practices brought to light in the Great Depression, Congress prohibited the use
or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."' 6  In turn, the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.)
promulgated its Rule 10b-5, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.6 1
The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the statute and the regulation in
conjunction, finding that use of the word "manipulative," in the context of
regulation of the securities markets, connotes "intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting
the price of securities. '62 Proof of such manipulation exists "if the manipulator
caused either actual or apparent activity or caused a [change] in the market
price." 63 In determining whether a trader has manipulated the market for a
security in violation of Rule 10b-5, courts have considered a variety of factors,
including "(1) price leadership by the manipulator; (2) the exercise of 'dominion
58 See generaly "Short Sakes" and Applicabk Regulations, TREATISE ON T-E LAW OF SECURITES
REGULATION, 5 LAW SEC. REG. § 14.22 (2015).
59 See general#j Ramirez, supra note 50 (distinguishing legitimate short selling from illegal market
manipulation and insider trading).6- 15 U.S.C. 78j0).
61 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
62 Ernst & Ernst v. Hocbfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
63 S.E.C. v. Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d 268, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting S.E.C. v. Resch-Cassin
& Co., 362 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
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and control of the market for the security'; (3) the manipulator's attempt to
reduce the 'floating supply of the security'; and (4) collapse of the market for
the security after the manipulator's activities cease."'( The central tenant of all
these examples of market manipulation is the Rule 10b-5 requirement of an
intent to deceive or artificially affect securities prices. Absent such intent, short
selling remains a legitimate practice well within the bounds of securities law. 65
One specific type of manipulation deserves particular recognition here: a
practice known as scalping. Scalping can be generally described as "the practice
of recommending the purchase of a security to a group of investors while one is
selling, or intending to sell, that security at the same time." 66  The typical
scalping case involves investment advisers or broker-dealers imposing this sort
of manipulation on their clients. The Supreme Court has held that scalping in
this context does constitute "a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client."67
Courts have subsequently fit the practice of scalping within the realm of
Rule 10b-5. A district court has found a "fraudulent scheme" in violation of
Rule 10b-5 where defendants obtained significant blocks of a security, then
"artificially inflated the stock price by engaging in a fraudulent promotional
campaign in which they failed to disclose their intent to sell their holdings" in
that security, and then "dumped the stock on the unsuspecting public for
substantial profits." 68
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also applied the scalping doctrine to
the context of a newspaper columnist who "failed to reveal to investor-readers
that he expected to gain personally if they followed his advice. '69 What the
defendant columnist failed to reveal was "that he had purchased the stock at a
bargain price knowing that he would write his column and then sell on the rise,
as he had done with other stocks before"-information that was "necessary to
avoid misleading [the defendant columnist]'s audience on the reliance they
could place on the column."70  The court's reasoning suggests that scalping
64 Id. at 287.
65 Ernst & Enst, 425 U.S. at 193 (holding that no private cause of action under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 could like in the absence of scienter intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud).
66 DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIF.S LITIGATION
AND ENFORCEMEN'r: CASFS AND MWn;,RAIms 642 (West cd., 3d cd. 2012).
67 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963)
(interpreting the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6).
68 S.E.C. v. Abellan, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1219 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
69 Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979).
70 Id at 1266-67.
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might not exist solely in the realm of market manipulation, but may also bear
some similarities to insider trading.7'
Regulating market manipulation is justified on the notion that "those who
artificially and fraudulently manipulate the price of securities should not have an
advantage over those from whom they buy, or to whom they sell, securities." 72
Legitimate short-sellers do not artificially and fraudulently manipulate prices,
but rather, help efficient markets reach appropriate prices by providing
information to the market that the short-seller has a "suspicion that there is
something afoot that has resulted in [the] overvaluation of the company."73
The "something afoot" identified by the short seller could come in the form of
weakening business prospects, corporate fraud, or, in Bass's case, a reliance on
potentially bad patents.
3. Insider Trading. Short selling can also be illegal when used in conjunction
with insider trading. Illegal insider trading refers to "trading by anyone (inside or
outside of the issuer) on any type of material nonpublic information about the
issuer or about the market for the security. '7 4 Like market manipulation,
insider trading also draws its regulatory origin from Rule 10b-5. 75 Two primary
theories exist for imposing liability for insider trading under Rule lOb-5: the
classical theory and the misappropriation theory.76
Under the classical theory of insider trading, liability attaches when a
"corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of
material, nonpublic information." 77  Such trading constitutes a "deceptive
device" in the context of 5 10(b) because such an insider who has obtained
confidential information about the corporation by reason of his position in the
corporation has a relationship of trust and confidence with the corporation's
shareholders, and trading on such information for his own benefit would
amount to taking unfair advantage of uninformed shareholders. 78 The classical
71 Id. at 1267 (holding that the defendant columnist violated Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 just
as corporate insiders do when they withhold material facts about a corporation's prospects while
trading its stock). This reasoning invokes the "special relationship" element of classical insider
trading, which is discussed at greater length below.
72 Ramirez, supra note 50.
73 Lee, supra note 5, at 278. See Christopher A. Stanley, The Panic Effe± Possible Unintended
Consequences of the Temporary Bans on Short Selkng Enacted During the 2008 Financial Crisis 4
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 267, 270 (2009) (noting that short selling improves market efficiency
by providing information about the perceived value of securities).
74 WILLIAM KS. WANG & MARC 1. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 1.1 (3d ed. 2010). By
contrast, a corporate director or officer buying or selling shares in her own company could
represent legal insider trading.
75 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
76 WANG & STEINBERG, spra note 74, § 5.1.
77 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
78 Id at 652.
[Vol. 23:329
12
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss2/5
THE DRUG SHORT
theory of insider trading is not limited to corporate officers and directors,
however.79 When certain outsiders, such as lawyers, accountants, underwriters,
or consultants working for the corporation, come into the legitimate possession
of corporate information, they can become temporary insiders, also subject to
the same fiduciary duty.8° Thus, the crux of liability in the classical theory of
insider trading is the existence of a "special relationship" between the trader and
the shareholders of the corporation in whose stock he trades. 81
Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, "a person commits
fraud in connection with a securities transaction ... when he misappropriates
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty
owed to the source of the information. '82 In O'Hagan, for example, the
Supreme Court applied the misappropriation theory to uphold the insider
trading conviction of a lawyer who traded in options contracts on a company
which was involved in a potential transaction with another company that the
defendant's law firm represented. 83 The Supreme Court distinguishes the
misappropriation theory from the classical theory by noting that instead of "a
fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the
company's stock" forming the basis for liability, "the misappropriation theory
premises liability on a fiduciary-turned trader's deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information."4
Critical to establishing liability for insider trading is a determination that the
information motivating the trade was "material" and "nonpublic." 85 Courts
have espoused varying standards for what must occur for information to
become public. By one formulation, in order for information to become
public, "it must be disseminated in a manner calculated to reach the securities
market place in general through recognized channels of distribution, and public
investors must be afforded a reasonable waiting period to react to the
information."86  Another formulation works on the premise that "once the
information is fully impounded in price, such information can no longer be
misused by trading because no further profit can be made."8 7  This theory,
79 See WANG & STlINBERG, supra note 74, § 5.2.3 (outlining various relationships which place
or might place a defendant in the classical special relationship triangle).
80 Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
81 Id at 657-58 (holding that the "duty to disclose information or refrain from trading on that
information is eatraordinary, it only arises from the relationchip betveen parties and not merely
from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market").
82 OHagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
83 Id at 647-48.
84 Id. at 652.
85 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 74, §§ 4.2-.3.
86 In re Faberge, Inc., 45 SEC 249, 255 (1973).
87 United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993).
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known as the efficient markets hypothesis, allows information to be
"considered public for Section 10(b) purposes even though there has been no
public announcement and only a small number of people know of it-"9 8
Under either theory of insider trading, an outsider (in that he has neither a
special relationship nor has he misappropriated information) is free to trade on
any legitimate information asymmetry that works to his advantage. However,
permitting outsiders to trade using material, nonpublic information may raise
similar concerns present in the manipulative practice of scalping: that the
outsider "controls-indeed creates-the very information that, when released,
is bound to affect the security's market price."8 9 However, outsider trading is
distinct from the market manipulation or scalping context, in that it can
promote socially productive ends from the trader-created-information feature.
That information may be costly or difficult to obtain, but allowing the finder to
trade on it-and therefore profit from it-incentivizes its discovery, and creates
a net social benefit as well.90
C. T1E KYLE BASS PROCEEDINGS
1. IiPR Petitions. Bass claims to have formed the idea for the investment
strategy at issue here after he learned of certain intellectual property practices in
which the pharmaceutical industry engaged. 91 He claims that his strategy does
not attack the entire pharmaceutical industry, but rather targets the "less than
1%" of pharmaceutical patents which he considers to represent particularly
egregious examples of "evergreening." ' 92 Evergreening is the practice of "filing
and refding 'improvement' patents for the same basic drug product," with the
goal of extending patent protection past the limited time period of the original
patent 93  Bass mentioned a change in dosage or in a micro tablet delivery
system to be two such improvements that should not "be backed by the U.S.
Patent Office to enable [the pharmaceutical companies engaged in such
practices] to have market-based monopolies with the government's backing." 94
8 Id
89 NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 66, at 642.
90 Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry 11. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incenlive Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 21, 23 (2006).
91 CNBC Exclusive: CNBC Transcript, supra note 1.
92 Id
93 Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Antidpating Hatch-Waxman Issues During the Claims
Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250 (1999).
94 CNBC Exclusive: CNBC Transcript, supra note 1.
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As of March 2016, the Coalition associated with Bass's hedge fund had filed
thirty-three IPR petitions.95 At that time, four had been denied and eighteen
had been instituted-a success rate of 20/0.96 When the PTAB denied those
three petitions, it did so on the contents of the petitions rather than the
appropriateness of Bass's strategy. Specifically, in two petitions against patents
held by Acorda Therapeutics, the Coalition alleged that posters presented at
industry conferences prior to the filing qualified as printed publications and
thus served to invalidate the granting of each patent.9 The PTAB ruled in each
case, however, that the Coalition had not made the "threshold showing that the
posters were sufficiently publicly accessible to qualify as a 'printed publication'
under § 102."98  In another decision not to institute a petition, the PTAB
rejected the Coalition's argument that the contents of a Phase II clinical trial
operated as prior art to render as obvious the claims of the patent at issue.99 By
contrast, in the one case to date in which the PTAB did institute IPR
proceedings, the PTAB held that the Coalition did demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood of success in proving obviousness from prior European and
domestic patent filings. 100
Bass's success in the markets has been just as mixed as his success at the
PTAB. While some stocks had fallen, the Coalition's IPR filings cannot bear all
the responsibility for share price fluctuation in target companies during this
(relatively short) time period. Poor earnings results affected some companies
individually, and U.S. presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's proposal to drive
down drug costs, negatively impacted the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. 101
Patent law firm Envision IP compiled data on share prices of companies whose
patents Bass challenged, including Biogen, Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Shire, Celgene,
95 Michelle Carniaux, PTAB Crashers: A Look at How Thfy Are Doing in the PTAB, IPR BLOG
(Oct. 19, 2015), http://interpartesreviewblog.com/ptab-crashers-a-look-at-how-they-are-doing-
in-the-ptab/.
96 Dani Kass, PTAB Approves Kyle Bass's 2nd Bid to Review MS Drug Patent, Law360 (Mar.
23, 2016, 7:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/775361/.
97 Decision at 2, Coalition for Affordable Drugs (Adroca) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.,
Case IPR12015-00720 (P.T.A.B. 2015); Decision at 2, Coalition for Affordable Drugs (Adroca)
LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., Case IPR2015-00817 (P.T.A.B. 2015).
98 Case IPR2015-00720 at 5, Case IPR2015-00817, at 5-6.
99 Decision at 11, 14-16, Coalition for Affordable Drugs V LI.C v. Biogen MA Inc., Case
I1Pl2015-01136 (P.T.A.B. 2015).
100 Decision at 3, 20, Coalition for Affordable Drugs Il ]LC v. Cosmo Technologies Ltd., Case
IPR2015-00988 (P.T.A.B. 2015).
101 Daniel Fisher, Are Short-Sellers Realty Making Mongy Off New Patent-Retiew Law? Not Yet
FORBES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/10/24/are-short-sell
ers-really-making-money-off-new-patent-review-law-not-yet/.
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and Accorda before and after IPR filings. 102 At the time of their analysis,
Biogen's share price was down about 36%, but this may be largely attributable
to a disappointing second quarter earnings miss and reduced outlook during the
same period. 0 3 Shares in Jazz Pharmaceuticals fell in price approximately 26%
between the first IPR petition filed on its patents and the date of the Envision
study, but here, again, analysts suggest competing theories for the decline,
including general unrest in the healthcare industry.104 Shares in Shire fell
approximately 12% between the first IPR petition filed on its patents and the
date of the Envision study, but the decline here might also be attributed to
corporate merger and acquisition activity. 105 Shares in Celgene actually rose by
approximately 1% during the same period. 10 6 Acorda may actually represent a
successful challenge and short for Bass and Hayman Capital. The company's
share price fell 29% on news of the filing, and dropped further after its CEO
appeared on CNBC to address the IPR filings. 10 7
2. Denial of the Motion for Sanctions forAbuse of Process. As Bass began filing his
IPR petitions, he made no attempt to hide or downplay his hedge fund's
concurrent short-selling investment strategy or the fact that this created an
inherent profit motive in his petition filings. 10 8 This placed the PTAB in the
new and unexplored position of determining whether Bass had inappropriately
exploited the IPR procedure. On Sept. 1, 2015, the PTAB issued an order in
one of Bass's ongoing IPR proceedings requesting further briefing from the
parties on the matter 1 9 Specifically, the PTAB sought further briefing on the
"extent, if any, the business objective or intent of the Petitioner should be
considered in reaching a determination of abuse of process," and "the resulting
social costs/benefits associated with a decision to address the merits of the
Petitions versus a decision to dismiss the Petitions for abuse of process without
reaching the merits of the Petitions." 110 In another proceeding, Bass argued
against profit motive as an abuse of process, observing that "at the heart of
102 Maulin Shah, Chalknge the Patent and Short the Stock - Does it Reall Work?, PATENTVuE (Oct.
20, 2015), http://patentvue.com/2015/10/20/challenge-the-patent-and-short-the-stock-does-it-
really-work/.
103 Id
104 Id
105 Id
106 Id
107 Id
108 See generally CNBC Exclusive: CNBC Transcipt, supra note 1.
109 Order at 2, Coalition for Affordable Drugs II, LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Cases
IPR2015-00990, IP1R2015-01093 (P.T.A.B. 2015).
110 Id
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nearly every patent and nearly every IPR, the motivation is profit.""' Bass
explains that the patent holder "files for and acquires patents to profit from the
higher drug prices that patents enable," and generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers "challenge patents to profit from generic sales. 11 2 He then
labeled the patent holder's criticism of Bass's motive as non-altruistic a "truthful
irrelevancy," because the "U.S. economy is based largely on the notion that
individual self-interest, properly directed, benefits society writ large." 113 In such
an economy, "people do not undertake socially valuable activity for free-not
[patent holders], not generics, not shareholders, and not investment funds." 114
Rather, such socially valuable activity, such as lowering drug prices, "must be
brought about by agents who will invest significant capital and do the hard
work of identifying and challenging weak patents.""1t 5
The PTAB was convinced by Bass's arguments in support of his profit
motive, and, on Sept. 1, 2015, declined to grant sanctions for an abuse of
process." 6 The PTAB acknowledged Bass's point about the profit motive
inherent in nearly every patent and every petition for inter partes review, then
concluded that "economic motive for challenging a patent claim does not itself
raise abuse of process issues."' 7 The PTAB further stated that it takes "no
position on the merits of short selling as an investment strategy other than it is
legal, and regulated."" 8
3. Industry Backlash. The pharmaceutical industry has not taken kindly to
Bass's IPR campaign. Beyond the failed request for abuse of process sanctions,
the industry has also taken its fight to the legislature. The Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and Biotechnology Industry
Organization (BIO), two trade groups representing the pharmaceutical industry,
co-authored a letter to members of the House Judiciary Cominittee in July
2015, expressing support for legislation that would "exempt certain
biopharmaceutical patents on approved medicines from the inter partes review
1 Opp'n to Patent Owner's Mot. for Sanctions Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6), 37 C.F.R.
42.12 at 1, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, IC v. Celgene Corp., Case 1PR2015-01092
(P.T.A.B. 2015).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 2.
114 Id
115 Id
116 Decision at 5, Coalition for Affordable Drugs V1, LLC v. Celgene Corp., Cases 1PR2015-
01092, IPR2015-01096, IPR2015-01102, PR2015-01103, IPR2015-01169 (P.T.A.B. 2015) (the
P.T.A.B. granted one decision that would apply to each of these five cases, since the parties were
the same and the issue applied to each case identically).
117 Id at 3.
118 Id
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process at the Patent and Trademark Office." 119 The trade groups argue that
intellectual property rights in the field of biopharmaceuticals are already
effectively regulated by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman). 2° Hatch-Waxman, they argue, struck a
delicate balance between two key objectives: increasing "the ability of generic
and biosimilar manufacturers to offer consumers lower cost versions of off-
patent medicines," and preserving "incentives for the discovery and
development of new, innovative medicines.' 121 The new IPR proceedings
create a level of uncertainty for pharmaceutical researchers and manufacturers
that the trade groups claim could upend the balance that the Hatch-Waxman
regime struck. 22 Accordingly, the trade groups seek a legislative exemption
from the IPR process for certain patents on FDA-approved medicines-"those
covering the product, its use or manufacture, and only after the date of FDA
approval"--but not, by contrast, all other pharmaceutical patents, including
those same patents prior to FDA approval. 123
In considering this request, members of Congress asked the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) to estimate how much a pharmaceutical exemption to
IPR proceedings would cost 124 The CBO found that if the exemption were to
be enacted, "federal spending would increase by $1.3 billion over ten years
because the exemption would delay the launch of certain generic products.' ' 25
Pharmaceutical consumers, whether they be individual patients, private health
insurers, or the federal government (by way of Medicare), would suffer from a
law which delayed generics from entering the market, since generics can cost up
to 90% less than their name-brand equivalents. a26 The trade groups counter
such claims by alleging that "there is no evidence that IPRs will allow generic
and biosimilar companies to bring products to market more quickly."'1 27
The prospect of raising drug prices, and subsequently federal health care
spending, is unlikely to gain much traction with members of Congress subject
119 Letter from James C. Greenwood, President and CEO of BIG & John J. Castellani,
President and CEO of PhRMA, to Rep. Chuck Grassley, Rep. Patrick Leahy, Rep. Robert
Goodlatte & Rep. John Conyers (ly 15, 2015), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/
files/pdf/joint-phrma-bio-letter-on-ipr-071515.pdf [hereinafter BIO & PhRMA Letter].
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Joseph Walker, DrugIndusty Rule Would Raise Medicare Costs: Congressional Budget Office estimates
$1.3 billon increase in federal health-care costs over a decade, WAI- ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.
wsj.com/aricles/drug-industry-bil-would-raise-medicare-costs-1441063248 (reporting on CBO
results presented orally to the Senate).
125 Id.
126 Id
177 BIO & PhRMA Letter, supra note 119.
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to popular political pressure. Groups including "AARP, an advocacy group for
retirees, insurers represented by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association,
and the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, an industry group for
pharmacy-benefit managers" have already publicly opposed the exemption. 128
Such pressure has already impacted the legislative proceedings surrounding the
changes proposed by the trade groups. Rep. Mimi Walters withdrew her
proposal to include a pharmaceutical IPR exemption in a U.S. House of
Representatives patent bill after the same exemption was opposed by Rep. Bob
Goodlatte, the bill's lead sponsor and chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee.1 29  Rep. Goodlatte reportedly stated in committee that his
constituents "frequently express concern about the high cost of prescription
drugs." 130 He added, "I certainly would have to answer to my constituents as to
why I allowed a provision into a bill that makes their medicine more
expensive."'' In light of such political pressure, the pharmaceutical trade
groups face a steep uphill battle in seeking a legislative exemption for FDA-
approved drugs from the IPR process. Thus Bass, and more importantly, any
others who wish to follow in his footsteps and challenge pharmaceutical patents
in an attempt to lower drug prices for all, are not likely to face a statutory bar.
Patent law aims to strike a balance between encouraging innovation and the
societal costs imposed by creating new property rights. Under a regime that
tends to over-grant patent protection yet provides no incentives to potential
challenges to patent validity, that balance starts to tip in the direction of
increased costs to society. Bass's activities, the simultaneous short sale and TPR
challenge, create the very incentive necessary to challenge bad patents and
ensure the continuing balance of all interests in the U.S. patent regime.
III. ANALysis
This part begins with a positive analysis of how Bass's strategy of filing IPR
petitions on a company's pharmaceutical patents while simultaneously shorting
that company's stock falls within the appropriate legal boundaries of the
relevant patent law (namely, the AIA requirements for IPR proceedings) and
the relevant securities law (namely statutes and regulations prohibiting insider
trading and market manipulation). Part III then moves to a normative analysis
of how Bass's strategy creates a desirable mechanism for overcoming the free-
128 Walker, supra note 124.
129 Id
130 Allison Gilchrist, Patent Law Change Could Increase Health Costs by $13 Billion Over 10 Years
PHARMAcY TimrFs (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2015/
october20l5/patent-law-change-could-increase-health-costs-by-13-billion-over-I0-years.
131 Id.
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rider problem that would otherwise cause the market to undersupply patent
validity challenges.
A. BASS'S STRATEGY COMPORTS WITH RELEVANT PATENT LAW
Bass and his associated entities have thus far carried out the IPR component
of their strategy in a manner that comports with both the letter of the ALA, with
regard to filing and procedural requirements, and the spirit of the AIA, in
availing themselves of the new, more efficient patent challenge procedures.
The AlA explidtly allows for any person who is not the owner of the patent
to file a petition to initiate IPR proceedings. 132 The statute contains no further
standing requirements applicable to Bass. Thus, the fact that Bass is a
disinterested third party (and not an alleged infringer of the patent in question)
does absolutely nothing to run afoul of the filing requirements set forth in the
AdA. The decision to lower the barriers to initiating patent challenges in an
administrative setting, as opposed to the more costly and more time-consuming
litigation setting, was no accident Congress's stated intention in creating the
IPR procedure was to establish "a more efficient and streamlined patent system
that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive
litigation costs."'1 33 Bass is hardly exploiting some esoteric loophole in the IPR
framework; rather, he is utilizing the procedures for the very reason Congress
intended.
This is not to say that any third party, Bass included, could never make use
of the IPR procedure in an improper or abusive manner. However, the AIA
grants the PTAB the authority to impose sanctions on a party for abusing the
IPR process. 134 In fact, corporations against which Bass has petitioned to
institute IPR proceedings have moved for the PTAB to grant such sanctions
against Bass and his related entities, and the PTAB has thus far refrained from
imposing any sanctions on Bass for abuse of process. 135 Society should
continue to trust the PTAB with the job of identifying abusive IPR practices
and imposing sanctions when appropriate, rather than categorically prohibiting
third parties like Bass from filing IPR petitions.
132 35 U.S.C. § 311.
133 H.R. REp. No. 112-98(1), at 40 (2011).
'14 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6).
135 See Order, supra note 109.
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B. BASS'S STRATEGY COMPORTS WITH RELEVANT SECURIIES LAW
Likewise, Bass and his associated entities have thus far carried out the short-
selling component of their strategy in a manner that steers clear of conduct that
could be considered market manipulation or insider trading.
Bass's trading does not meet the requirements for a finding of market
manipulation. In order to be liable for a violation of Rule 10b-5, Bass would
need to demonstrate "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or
defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of
securities."'136 Bass's activities-short selling the stock of companies whose
patents he has challenged simultaneously---do not suggest that he created
"either actual or apparent activity or caused a [change] in the market price,"
examples of the proof requisite for a finding of market manipulation. 37
Opponents of his strategy may argue that he is attempting to cause a change
in the market price with the filing of his IPR petitions, but the news of the
filings has had a negligible, if any, effect on the stock prices of the companies in
question."8 That Bass has continued full steam with his strategy in light of this
suggests that his short sales are predicated on his belief that the companies are
overvalued for their reliance on bad patents, not a belief that the news of his
IPR filings will itself tank the share price. If this is the case, Bass's activities
should not be considered manipulative because "[t]rading based on a genuine
belief that prices will ultimately move in the direction of the trades is the
essence of nonmanipulative trading."'1 39 Until any evidence suggests otherwise,
Bass seems to rely on perfectly acceptable reasoning for his short sales, and not
on an attempt to deceive or defraud investors by gaining a profit which "comes
solely from the trader's ability to move prices and not from his possession of
valuable information."' 40
Bass's trading also does not meet the requirements for insider trading under
either theory. The classical theory premises insider trading liability on a special
relationship between the trader, the issuing corporation, and the other
shareholders of that corporation. 141 Bass has no such relationship with the
corporations whose patents he challenges or their shareholders. He is not a
director or officer of any of these companies, nor is he a lawyer, accountant, or
136 Ernst &Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.
137 Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
138 See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
139 Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit 'Manipulation" in Financial Markets?,
105 JARv. L. RFV. 509 (1991) (discussing various definitions of "market manipulation," including
conduct that forces a security's price to an artificial level).
140 Id. at 510.
141 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58.
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consultant to any of the companies-the "temporary insiders" that are also
capable of having such a special relationship with the issuing corporations. 142
Far from an insider, Bass's connection to these companies extends no further
than his role as an adverse party in the 1PR proceedings in question here. In
fact, the activities Bass has undertaken, when viewed altogether, place him in
the category of outsiders engaged in socially beneficial activity deserving of
protection from insider trading liability. 143 The misappropriation theory of
insider trading, by contrast, premises liability for insider trading on the
misappropriation of confidential information. 144 One could debate as to what
level of generality the information that Bass is trading on actually comprises-
the information that the corporation in question relies on potentially invalid
patents, or the information that the corporation in question may potentially
soon be subject to IPR proceedings against a patent in its portfolio-but in
neither case do Bass's activities amount to misappropriation. Unlike the
defendant in O'Hagan who committed insider trading when, "in breach of a
duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm... and to its client," he
"secretly [converted] the principal's information for personal gain,"'145 Bass
effectively created the very information that he later used in trading.
The practice of scalping does bear some similarity to Bass's trading activity
in that "the scalper controls-indeed creates-the very information that, when
released, is bound to affect the security's market price."'146 Given the limited
context of the courts' decisions on scalping-investment advisers147 and
financial journalists' 48 -it remains to be determined whether or not Bass's
activities, absent the trusting relationship of an investment adviser and his
clients or a financial journalist and his readers, would qualify as prohibited
scalping or not. Given the ambiguity of the relevant securities laws, courts
should defer to the PTAB and its governing statutes to determine the propriety
of Bass's activities.
C. BASS'S STRATEGY PROVIDES A MECHANISM FOR OVERCOMING THE FREE-
RIDER PROBLEM IN PATENT VALIDITY CHALLENGES
Bass's strategy likely comports with the IPR procedural requirements
established by the AA, and does not fall outside the boundaries of legal trading
142 Id. at 655 n.14.
'43 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 90, at 23.
144 OI-Iagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
145 Id. at 503.
146 NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 66, at 642.
147 Id. at 181-82.
148 Zwei, 594 F.2d at 1266.
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activities established by U.S. securities law. A normative analysis of the
desirability of the strategy that Bass identified as a means to overcome the free-
rider problem in patent validity challenges reveals that he has identified a viable
strategy incentivize attacks on bad patents.
The free-rider problem in patent validity challenges is based on the idea that
once a patent is invalidated, many people benefit other than the challenger.
This means that if a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer were to file an IPR
petition, and the PTAB were to initiate IPR proceedings and ultimately
invalidate the patent, the generic manufacturer would have succeeded and could
then enter the market for that drug to compete with the previous patent holder.
But so could every other competitor. Herein lies the paradox underpinning this
free-rider problem: by the very nature of the generic manufacturer's success, the
drug is no longer patent-protected, so any and every manufacturer is free to
enter the market for that drug. Only the challenger, however, has invested the
time and resources into initiating the challenge. Who would want to make such
an investment knowing that the spoils would not be his alone, but would be
enjoyed by all his competitors as well? Just like free-rider problems can stifle
the discovery of new technologies and useful arts, so too can they stifle the
discovery and invalidation of bad patents.
Several previous proposed solutions to this free-rider problem are based on
the premise of providing extra compensation to one who invests the time and
resources into initiating a challenge on a potentially bad patent-149 This
approach seeks to overcome the barrier to innovation erected by the fact that,
as a public good, an invalidated patent confers a benefit onto everyone.
However, while it is true that many people benefit, only one entity loses-the
patent holder. The patent holder's loss of the right to exploit the patent-
conferred is likely to negatively impact its business model, and put a dent in its
revenue. The loss to revenue is likely to manifest in a falling share price, and
U.S. securities law already provides one with a legal way to profit from a falling
share price: short selling.
Traders engaged in legitimate short selling are lauded for their role in
providing relevant information to the market.150 Securities markets "depend on
new information to cause price changes," so in order to best promote market
efficiency, measures which "cause the information to lose its value and thus
eliminate the incentive to acquire the information in the first place" should be
avoided.'5' Often, the information in question concerns a problem with a given
149 See Kesan, supra note 27; Miller, supra note 32; Thomas, supra note 32 (summarizing various
proposals for creating incentives for patent challengers).
150 Lee, supra note 5, at 278.
151 Fischel & Ross, supra note 139, at 509.
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company.15 2 Just like the ability to short-sell stock provided traders with the
incentive to invest the time and resources into benefitting the public by
ferreting out instances of corporate fraud at companies like Enron, Lehman
Brothers, and MBIA, Inc., 15 3 so too can the ability to short-sell the stock of the
corporations in question provide an incentive to invest the time and resources
into benefitting the public by ferreting out potentially invalid patents.
Bass has exhibited every intention of carrying on with his strategy. Yet Bass
is neither a patent prosecutor with the PTO nor a law professor devoted to the
study of patent validity problems. He is a hedge fund manager. In the end, his
IPR petitions ultimately exist because of his and his fund's investors' profit
motive. And in the end, there isn't a thing wrong with that.
Ironically, his critics overlook the fact that profit motive goes to the heart of
intellectual property protection. Bass would probably not have filed a single
IPR petition if he did not believe he could subsequently make money for
himself and for his investors by short selling the stock of the companies whose
drug patents he was challenging. But would those drug companies have filed a
single patent application if they did not believe they could subsequently make
money for themselves and for their investors by using the patent-conferred
monopoly to exclude competitors from forcing prices lower? In this way, the
U.S. government consciously chooses to temporarily insulate the market for a
given product from the forces of supply and demand as an incentive for
inventors to benefit society by investing effort and resources into discovering
new and useful information.
Pharmaceuticals that meet the novelty and utility requirements are certainly
examples of information that benefit society. Unfortunately, under the current
U.S. patent regime, some pharmaceuticals that fail to meet the novelty
requirement are granted patent protection. This harms, rather than benefits,
society because improperly granted patents distort free market forces for no
good reason; society has granted the temporary right of exclusion to the patent
holder, yet received nothing in return. Accordingly, information leading to the
invalidation of an improperly granted patent is also socially beneficial. Whether
knowingly or unwittingly, Bass has identified a mechanism to create incentives
for investing effort and resources into discovering bad patents.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the free market, the potential to earn a profit encourages individuals and
firms to take risks and invest time and money into their ventures. This
152 See Lee, supra note 5, at 287; Stanley, supra note 73, at 270.
153 Lee, supra note 5, at 279.
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generally leads to an efficient allocation of resources, and efficient levels of
production and consumption. Sometimes, however, market inefficiencies, such
as free-rider problems, lead to suboptimal levels of production. In those
instances, the government may step in to create a profit motive where one
would otherwise be lacking. Historically, the patent law regime conferred
temporary monopolies in order to overcome a free-rider problem and
encourage inventions. Now, procedures created by the AIA in conjunction
with relevant provisions of U.S. securities law create a mechanism to overcome
a different but related free-rider problem, and encourage challenges to
potentially bad patents.
Eventually changing market conditions, pressure from investors to adopt
some new investment strategy, or a number of other factors may cause Bass to
discontinue his short-and-challenge strategy. A profit motive, after all, does not
necessarily mean a profit guarantee. Importantly, though, even after he stops,
his strategy lives on. In order to best preserve the integrity of the U.S. patent
regime, some future third party, whether the world's most benevolent public
interest crusader or a billionaire hedge fund manager, must be given the
incentive to discover and challenge patents that should never have been granted
in the first place. The existence of such patents only serves to keep drug prices
artificially high, as demonstrated by a CBO estimate of the cost of exempting
pharmaceuticals from IPR challenges altogether. 154 However, given that the
discovery of and challenge to bad patents are public goods (much like the
inventions underlying the patents themselves), such discoveries and challenges
are likely to be undersupplied by the market absent a profit motive. Previous
solutions create a bounty to compensate a successful challenger. Bass has
identified a new mechanism whereby a successful challenger is able to
compensate himself through short selling the stock of companies whose patents
he challenges. This strategy can serve as a valuable new tool for overcoming
the free-rider problem inherent in patent validity challenges, and help to protect
both the strength of the U.S. patent regime and the efficient allocation of
resources in the market for pharmaceuticals.
154 Walker, supra note 124.
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